Security Comments on “Resisting Compromise in Remote Swarm Attestation: Dependable and Secure Key Computation for Prover and Verifier”

作者：Dariush Abbasinezhad-Mood · 发表于：IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · 年份：2026 · DOI：10.1109/tdsc.2026.3684550 · 研究领域：Computer Science

Quite recently, the authors of (Sekhavati and Nikooghadam 2026) (DOI: 10.1109/TDSC.2025.3605538) have proposed an interesting ultra-lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol between a prover and an edge verifier. They further stated that their protocol is resistant to known session-specific temporary information (KSSTI) attack and offers perfect forward secrecy (PFS). Not to undermine the noteworthy contributions of their work, in this comment paper, we show that their proposed protocol cannot offer PFS nor can resist KSSTI attack.