How government intervention and supply chain competition and cooperation affect power battery recycling from a game theory perspective?

作者：Kai Liu · 发表于：International Journal of Low-Carbon Technologies · 年份：2025 · DOI：10.1093/ijlct/ctaf059 · 被引用次数：6

In this paper, I delve into two supply chains, each composed of one battery supplier and one new energy vehicle manufacturer. Considering government intervention, competition, and cooperation, I analyze six scenarios. It is found that vertical/horizontal cooperation benefits the power battery-recycling rate, while the deposit-subsidy policy has limited impact, so the government should raise the subsidy. When some firms cooperate while others do not, it benefits the cooperators and harms non-cooperators. Scenario C maximizes the supply chain’s overall profit, yet Scenarios CC or TC are not always best for firm profitability. Notably, social welfare peaks in Scenario TC.