Security Weaknesses of a Lightweight Privacy-Preserving Edge Computing Based Ciphertext Retrieval Scheme

作者：Ieee Y. Sreenivasa Rao Senior Member · 发表于：IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing · 年份：2026 · DOI：10.1109/tcc.2026.3651561 · 被引用次数：1 · 研究领域：Computer Science

Most recently, Wang et al. proposed (in IEEE TCC, doi: 10.1109/TCC.2024.3461732) a lightweight privacy-preserving ciphertext retrieval scheme based on edge computing (termed as LPCR) by combining ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption and searchable encryption techniques. The authors claimed that LPCR can achieve the security of chosen plaintext attack (CPA) and chosen keyword attack (CKA), and resist collusion attack. However, by presenting a concrete plaintext recovery attack (PRA), we demonstrate that every decryption key has the ability to decrypt any user’s ciphertext and get the plaintext document encrypted in it. Next, using PRA, we illustrate that LPCR is vulnerable to CPA, CKA and collusion attacks.