Political Ties and Bribery: Evidence from China’s Private Listed Firms

作者：Chong Zhong · 发表于：Emerging Markets Finance and Trade · 年份：2026 · DOI：10.1080/1540496x.2026.2653642 · 研究领域：Corruption and Economic Development、Political Influence and Corporate Strategies、China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance

While much scholarly attention has examined the determinants and outcomes of political ties and bribery separately, the relationship between these two prevalent non-market strategies remains underexplored. Drawing on resource dependence theory and the institutional voids perspective, we propose that political ties and bribery are positively linked, as such connections generate political dependence in emerging markets. Empirical evidence from panel data on Chinese private listed firms supports this argument: firms with political ties are more likely to make higher bribery payments, and this relationship holds even after accounting for the anti-corruption campaign. Moreover, the positive association is negatively moderated by legal development and industry competition. These findings carry theoretical, policy, and managerial implications, offering insights into the interplay between corporate political activities and corrupt practices in emerging economies.