Privacy in Theory, Bugs in Practice: Grey-Box Auditing of Differential Privacy Libraries

作者：Tudor Cebere, David Erb, Damien Desfontaines, Aurélien Bellet, Jack Fitzsimons · 发表于：arXiv (Cornell University) · 年份：2026 · DOI：10.48550/arxiv.2602.17454 · 被引用次数：1 · 研究领域：Security and Verification in Computing、Advanced Malware Detection Techniques、Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data

Differential privacy (DP) implementations are notoriously prone to errors, with subtle bugs frequently invalidating theoretical guarantees. Existing verification methods are often impractical: formal tools are too restrictive, while black-box statistical auditing is intractable for complex pipelines and fails to pinpoint the source of the bug. This paper introduces Re:cord-play, a gray-box auditing paradigm that inspects the internal state of DP algorithms. By running an instrumented algorithm on neighboring datasets with identical randomness, Re:cord-play directly checks for data-dependent control flow and provides concrete falsification of sensitivity violations by comparing declared sensitivity against the empirically measured distance between internal inputs. We generalize this to Re:cord-play-sample, a full statistical audit that isolates and tests each component, including untrusted ones. We show that our novel testing approach is both effective and necessary by auditing 12 open-source libraries, including SmartNoise SDK, Opacus, and Diffprivlib, and uncovering 13 privacy violations that impact their theoretical guarantees. We release our framework as an open-source Python package, thereby making it easy for DP developers to integrate effective, computationally inexpensive, and seamless privacy testing as part of their software development lifecycle.