Sync-Millibottleneck Attack on Microservices Cloud Architecture

作者：Xuhang Gu, Qingyang Wang, Qiben Yan, Jianshu Liu, Calton Pu · 年份：2024 · DOI：10.1145/3634737.3644991 · 被引用次数：5 · 研究领域：Network Security and Intrusion Detection、Software System Performance and Reliability、Cloud Computing and Resource Management

The modern web services landscape is characterized by numerous fine-grained, loosely coupled microservices with increasingly stringent low-latency requirements. However, this architecture also brings new performance vulnerabilities. In this paper, we introduce a novel low-volume application layer DDoS attack called the Sync-Millibottleneck (SyncM) attack, specifically targeting microservices. The goal of this attack is to cause a long-tail latency problem that violates the service-level agreement (SLA) while evading state-of-the-art DDoS detection/defense mechanisms. The SyncM attack exploits two unique features of microservices architecture: (1) the shared frontend gateway that directs user requests to mid-tier/backend microservices, and (2) the co-existence of multiple logically independent execution paths, each with its own bottleneck resource. By creating synchronized millibottlenecks (i.e., sub-second duration bottlenecks) on multiple independent execution paths, SyncM attack can cause the queuing effect in each execution path to be propagated and superimposed in the shared frontend gateway. As a result, SyncM triggers surprisingly high latency spikes in the system, even when all system resources are far from saturation, making it challenging to trace the cause of performance instability.