Dis-confirmatory evidence drives confidence

作者：Annika Boldt, Yishu Sun, Kobe Desender · 年份：2023 · DOI：10.31234/osf.io/tsr9z · 被引用次数：7 · 研究领域：Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies、Neural dynamics and brain function、Face Recognition and Perception

Assessing one’s own decisions is a crucial component of cognition, enabling adaptive behavior. According to normative models, the brain employs available evidence optimally to evaluate decisions. When computing decision confidence, the normative strategy thus involves giving equal weight to each evidence sample. However, recent findings suggest that the brain tends to overweight decision-congruent information when forming confidence judgements, a finding referred to as the “positive-evidence bias” (PEB). Here, we report the re-analysis of nine datasets involving human participants who judged the average color of eight shapes and gave their confidence. This task precisely allowed us to disentangle the impact of choice-confirming and choice-conflicting evidence on the formation of confidence. In striking contrast to previous findings, our findings show that participants overly rely on evidence that conflicts with their choice, contrary to the normative model and the PEB. To explain this response-incongruent evidence (RIE) effect in the computation of confidence, we fitted an extended log-posterior-ratio for confidence (c-LPR) model to our data and show that the same robust averaging principle that influences decisions also accounts for these confidence effects: incongruent evidence receives a stronger weight in the computation of confidence because it lies closer to the category boundary around which there is heightened sensitivity. In a preregistered experiment, we then empiri...