ATRIUM: Runtime attestation resilient under memory attacks

作者：Shaza Zeitouni, Ghada Dessouky, Orlando Arias, Dean Sullivan, Ahmad Ibrahim, Yier Jin, Ahmad‐Reza Sadeghi · 年份：2017 · DOI：10.1109/iccad.2017.8203803 · 被引用次数：74 · 研究领域：Security and Verification in Computing、Cloud Data Security Solutions、Advanced Malware Detection Techniques

Remote attestation is an important security service that allows a trusted party (verifier) to verify the integrity of a software running on a remote and potentially compromised device (prover). The security of existing remote attestation schemes relies on the assumption that attacks are software-only and that the prover's code cannot be modified at runtime. However, in practice, these schemes can be bypassed in a stronger and more realistic adversary model that is hereby capable of controlling and modifying code memory to attest benign code but execute malicious code instead - leaving the underlying system vulnerable to Time of Check Time of Use (TOCTOU) attacks. In this work, we first demonstrate TOCTOU attacks on recently proposed attestation schemes by exploiting physical access to prover's memory. Then we present the design and proof-of-concept implementation of ATRIUM, a runtime remote attestation system that securely attests both the code's binary and its execution behavior under memory attacks. ATRIUM provides resilience against both software- and hardware-based TOCTOU attacks, while incurring minimal area and performance overhead.