Does External Monitoring from the Government Improve the Performance of State-Owned Enterprises?

作者：Shengyu Li, Hongsong Zhang · 发表于：The Economic Journal · 年份：2021 · DOI：10.1093/ej/ueab048 · 被引用次数：24 · 研究领域：Corporate Finance and Governance、Corruption and Economic Development、Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth

Abstract In this paper we investigate the impact of external monitoring from the government on state-owned enterprise performance, using the variation in monitoring strength arising from a nationwide policy change and firms’ geographic location in China. We utilise a structural approach to estimate input prices and productivity separately at the firm level using commonly available production data. We show that enhanced external monitoring, as a key component of corporate governance, can substantially reduce managerial expropriation in procurement (proxied by input prices) and shirking in production management (proxied by productivity). The results suggest that government monitoring can be an effective policy instrument to improve state-owned enterprise performance.