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Property Rights and Finance

作者:Simon Johnson, John McMillan, Christopher Woodruff · 发表于:American Economic Review · 年份:2002 · DOI:10.1257/000282802762024539 · 被引用次数:984 · 研究领域:Banking stability, regulation, efficiency、Corporate Finance and Governance、Corruption and Economic Development

Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.