A Hardware/Software Collaborative SM4 Implementation Resistant to Side-channel Attacks on ARM-FPGA Embedded SoC

作者：Peng Ping, Cunqing Ma, Jingquan Ge, Neng Gao, Chenyang Tu · 年份：2020 · DOI：10.1109/iscc50000.2020.9219591 · 被引用次数：5 · 研究领域：Security and Verification in Computing、Cryptographic Implementations and Security、Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security

The SM4 algorithm is the first commercial cryptographic algorithm officially announced in China for wireless local area network products. It is suitable for scenarios that require high real-time performance, such as wireless communication and IoT sensor nodes. It can be seen that the security research of the SM4 algorithm is of great significance to wireless devices in the IoT. Like other symmetric encryption algorithms, the SM4 algorithm faces some security threats, such as side-channel attacks. Among them, cache timing attacks and power/electromagnetic analysis attacks are becoming more and more threatening due to their low execution difficulty and powerful attack capabilities. Most implementations of anti-side channel attacks against the SM4 algorithm can only resist one of above two attacks. However, side-channel leakages associated with above attacks often coexist.Therefore in this paper, we present a hardware/software collaborative SM4 implementation on ARM-FPGA embedded SoC which can resist above two types of attacks simultaneously. It randomly divides the 32 rounds of SM4 encryption into three stages: the beginning software stage, the middle hardware stage, and the final software stage. Besides, we shuffle the order of some independent operations in each round of the software stages and add dummy rounds to the hardware stage. Finally, we conduct above two types of attacks on unprotected software/hardware SM4, shuffled software SM4 and our scheme, then evaluate their p...