Consequences Matter: Compassion in Conservation Means Caring for Individuals, Populations and Species

作者：Paul J. Johnson, Vanessa M. Adams, Doug P. Armstrong, Sandra E. Baker, Duan Biggs, Luigi Boitani, Alayne Cotterill, Emma Dale, Holly O’Donnell, David J. T. Douglas, Egil Dröge, John G. Ewen, Ruth E. Feber, Piero Genovesi, Clive Hambler, Bart J. Harmsen, Lauren A. Harrington, Amy E. Hinks, Joelene Hughes, Lydia K.D. Katsis, Andrew J. Loveridge, Axel Moehrenschlager, Christopher A. J. O'Kane, Meshach Andres Pierre, Stephen M. Redpath, Lovemore Sibanda, Pritpal S. Soorae, Mark Stanley Price, Peter Tyrrell, Alexandra Zimmermann, Amy Dickman · 发表于：Animals · 年份：2019 · DOI：10.3390/ani9121115 · 被引用次数：32 · 研究领域：Environmental Philosophy and Ethics、Religion, Ecology, and Ethics、Animal and Plant Science Education

Human activity affecting the welfare of wild vertebrates, widely accepted to be sentient, and therefore deserving of moral concern, is widespread. A variety of motives lead to the killing of individual wild animals. These include to provide food, to protect stock and other human interests, and also for sport. The acceptability of such killing is widely believed to vary with the motive and method. Individual vertebrates are also killed by conservationists. Whether securing conservation goals is an adequate reason for such killing has recently been challenged. Conventional conservation practice has tended to prioritise ecological collectives, such as populations and species, when their interests conflict with those of individuals. Supporters of the 'Compassionate Conservation' movement argue both that conservationists have neglected animal welfare when such conflicts arise and that no killing for conservation is justified. We counter that conservationists increasingly seek to adhere to high standards of welfare, and that the extreme position advocated by some supporters of 'Compassionate Conservation', rooted in virtue ethics, would, if widely accepted, lead to considerable negative effects for conservation. Conservation practice cannot afford to neglect consequences. Moreover, the do-no-harm maxim does not always lead to better outcomes for animal welfare.