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Concise security bounds for practical decoy-state quantum key distribution

作者:Charles Ci Wen Lim, Marcos Curty, Nino Walenta, Feihu Xu, Hugo Zbinden · 发表于:Physical Review A · 年份:2014 · DOI:10.1103/physreva.89.022307 · 被引用次数:413 · 研究领域:Quantum Information and Cryptography、Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture、Quantum-Dot Cellular Automata

Due to its ability to tolerate high channel loss, decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) has been one of the main focuses within the QKD community. Notably, several experimental groups have demonstrated that it is secure and feasible under real-world conditions. Crucially, however, the security and feasibility claims made by most of these experiments were obtained under the assumption that the eavesdropper is restricted to particular types of attacks or that the finite-key effects are neglected. Unfortunately, such assumptions are not possible to guarantee in practice. In this work, we provide concise and tight finite-key security bounds for practical decoy-state QKD that are valid against general attacks.