TRIPS, Trade, and Technology Transfer

作者：Michael Scott Taylor · 发表于：Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · 年份：1993 · DOI：10.2307/135891 · 被引用次数：165 · 研究领域：Intellectual Property and Patents、Innovation Policy and R&D、Economic Growth and Productivity

A North-South model of unintentional technology transfer is developed where the stringency of Southern patent protection provides the institutional backdrop for a strategic game in a high-tech goods market. The appropriability regime is set endogenously and combines elements of imperfect Southern patent protection with the protection afforded by market-made Northern technology 'masking.' Less stringent protection of Northern intellectual property can 'work' much like other strategic trade policies; therefore, developed countries appear to be right in demanding discussion of intellectual property rights in GATT.