Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems

作者：Nicolas Gisin, Sylvain Fasel, Barbara Kraus, Hugo Zbinden, G. Ribordy · 发表于：Physical Review A · 年份：2006 · DOI：10.1103/physreva.73.022320 · 被引用次数：592 · 研究领域：Quantum Information and Cryptography、Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture、Quantum Mechanics and Applications

General Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems, i.e., attacks on Alice or Bob's system via the quantum channel, are analyzed. We illustrate the power of such attacks with today's technology and conclude that all systems must implement active counter measures. In particular, all systems must include an auxiliary detector that monitors any incoming light. We show that such counter measures can be efficient, provided that enough additional privacy amplification is applied to the data. We present a practical way to reduce the maximal information gain that an adversary can gain using Trojan-horse attacks. This does reduce the security analysis of the two-way plug-and-play implementation to those of the standard one-way systems.