Criteria and indicators for environmental service compensation and reward mechanisms : realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor

作者：Meine van Noordwijk, Beria Leimona, L. Emerton, Thomas P. Tomich, Sandra J. Velarde · 发表于：RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 年份：2007 · 被引用次数：121 · 研究领域：Economic and Environmental Valuation、Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management、Environmental Conservation and Management

Working markets are by definition realistic, voluntary and conditional. Their effects on poverty and human well-being are mixed. Many environmental problems and the increasing scarcity of ecosystem services are linked to ‘market failures’. Time lags, complex cause-effect linkages, and multiple layers of rights and responsibilities, make many environmental ‘service’ considerations externalities of decision-making processes focussed on ‘marketable goods’. Which combination of characteristics is needed for mechanisms that internalize the costs and benefits of ecosystem utilization enough to avoid environmental degradation beyond thresholds of sustainability? Can market-based mechanisms be pro-poor? We set out to identify mutually – beneficial opportunities for the ‘modifiers’ and ‘beneficiaries’ of environmental services to develop agreements and contracts as an alternative to a purely regulatory approach to environmental management. We do not ignore regulation, but rather see regulations as defining the domain for voluntary and conditional rewards for environmental services (ES). Inputs into the analysis are derived from theory and emerging practice in action research sites and pilot application schemes. Theoretical insights are drawn from social welfare theory (development and environmental economics and project appraisal), institutional economics (principal agent problems, game theory) and integrated natural resource management. We present a general framework to clarify the m...