Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor

作者：Paul M. Churchland · 发表于：Philosophy of Science · 年份：1988 · DOI：10.1086/289425 · 被引用次数：326 · 研究领域：Philosophy and Theoretical Science、Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics、Embodied and Extended Cognition

The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: (1) to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; (2) to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly false; and (3) to provide some additional arguments for, and illustrations of, the theoretical character of all observation judgments.